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When voting takes place in democratic institutions, we ﬁnd (either explicitly or im-
plicitly) that there is an agenda setter or a formateur. Such players are uniquely able
to make substantive proposals for given topics. Their statuses remain intact even af-
ter rejections of proposals, but they must revise rejected proposals constructively (e.g.
towards a compromise). We model this in a general environment, show that the equi-
librium outcome is generically unique, and characterize it explicitly. The equilibrium
outcome is robust to (partially) binding communication between the formateur and
the voters. As illustrations, we consider majority bargaining about a cake (leaned on
Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), where the formateur ends up being a perfect dictator, and
a model of legislative voting (leaned on Jackson and Moselle, 2002), where he is a
dictator if his ideological position is within the quartiles of the parliament. In these
cases, our model implements (reversed) McKelvey majority paths. Depending on the
valuations, the formateur’s power may be weakened when parliamentary decisions
can be revised, as this may facilitate tacit collusion amongst the voters.
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When majorities are sufﬁcient to implement decisions, then coalitions form; either implicitly, by
players that vote in the same way, or explicitly, by players that sign coalition contracts. Models of
coalitional bargaining help us to understand which decisions are made and which coalitions form. In
this paper, we deﬁne a general framework to analyze coalitional bargaining games and we character-
ize the perfect equilibrium outcomes for bargaining rules that apply to a wide range of democratic
voting institutions. We prove existence of equilibria, uniqueness of the outcomes, and provide a uni-
ﬁed characterization of the outcomes. Based on that, speciﬁc assumptions concerning the option sets,
the preference functions, and the voting rules allow us to derive speciﬁc predictions.
Our model has the following three cornerstones. First, the formateur remains in his position even
after rejections of proposals (the formateur is the player with the right to make proposals that would
be voted upon). Secondly, when the formateur revises a previously rejected proposal, then he has
to do so in a constructive way (to avoid “blame game” politics, as discussed below). Thirdly, there
may be communication between the formateur and the other players that differs from cheap talk (e.g.
when misleading communication can be retaliated within existing hierarchies). These cornerstones
have predecessors in the literature, but typically, they have been studied in isolation and in restrictive
circumstances. Our analysis generalizes these studies and uniﬁes the respective classes of model.
The assumption that formateurs stay in their positions even after rejections applies to both major
strings of political bargaining: government formation and parliamentary legislation. It applies to gov-
ernment formation when the head of state appoints the formateur in the beginning of the bargaining
phase (as in the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland). The formateur would then ask the other players to
sign coalition contracts, to partially ﬁx the portfolio allocation and the political programme (Cheibub
et al., 2004). Coalition contracts are offered behind the scenes, and thus, the formateur remains in his
position even if such an offer should be rejected.
In the second case (parliamentary legislation), there typically are unique players with the ability
to make substantive proposals (agenda setters). Their time horizons are large, as proposals can be
revised quickly and as they can be made informally (e.g. at a cabinet table), and thus agenda setters
are formateurs in our sense. Their proposal ranges may be restricted (thematically), which we take
as given. Depending on the context, agenda setters can be ministers (Laver and Shepsle, 1990),
presidents (Persson et al., 1997, 2000, and Primo, 2002), chairmen or board members within parties
(Cox and McCubbins, 1993), or majority parties (coalitions) in parliaments (e.g. in the UK and
in Ireland, Döring, 1995, in the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins, 2005, and in
the German Bundestag, Loewenberg, 2003). Apparently, the required voting shares depend on the
context of the game, but as we show, there is a common intuition behind the bargaining games that is
independent of the voting rules.
By assuming that the formateur is not replaced after rejections of proposals, we depart from the
branch of literature that followed Baron and Ferejohn (1989); for instance Baron (1991), Chatterjee
1et al. (1993), Okada (1996), Seidmann and Winter (1998), and Ray and Vohra (1999). This literature
describes coalitional bargaining in non–institutional circumstances, e.g. cartel formation and govern-
ment formation when the Head of State does not appoint a formateur before a coalition has formed
(as in Italy). In another related branch of models, it is assumed that the formateur commits to a coali-
tion before any distributive or programmatic aspects are negotiated (in particular, in Diermeier et al.,
2002, 2003, but see also Bloch, 1996, and Baron and Diermeier, 2001). Our model generalizes this
branch in that the formateur can require potential coalition partners to commit to some distributive
and programmatic aspects (via coalition contracts) before he commits to a coalition. The results of
the multilateral negotiation concerning any remaining aspects are taken as given in our model.
Our second main assumption is that rejected proposals have to be revised constructively. This
is related to the literature on blame game politics (Rohde and Simon, 1985; Smith, 1988; Woolley,
1991). A formateur who is unwilling to compromise can be blamed as being “unconstructive” by
the players that have to vote on his proposals, and following such blames, his reputation may suf-
fer signiﬁcantly (see Groseclose and McCarty, 2001). In turn, a formateur who revises a rejected
proposal towards a compromise can not be blamed of being unconstructive. Additionally, we say
that formateurs can not be blamed of being unconstructive when they come up with entirely new
proposals. Implicitly, we show that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on whether the latter
applies or not. To simplify the notation, we assume that the formateur would have to leave ofﬁce
after his ﬁrst unconstructive proposal, i.e. after his ﬁrst proposal that is no compromise and not new
(but any other ﬁnite limit leads to the same equilibrium outcome). Then, an outside option would
apply. The resulting bargaining model, where the formateur can revise rejected proposals but must be
constructive, is called constructive proposals game. We show that the solution is generically unique
under perfectness and characterize it.
The model of constructive proposals does not allow for communication between the formateur
and other players. In particular, the formateur could be informed by the voters about the proposals
they would accept (or, he could ask them). Such communication becomes relevant if it is not cheap
talk. As it appears, it is not cheap talk in our circumstances. For, the structures of parties and
coalitions are hierarchical and resemble legal partnerships (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). As a result,
formateurs would be able to observe misleading communication, and they have a number of measures
to retaliate it: lack of promotion, demotion, and expulsion from the coalition (Cox and McCubbins,
1994). To investigate the robustness of our predictions to such communication, we ﬁrst analyze
a case of perfectly binding communication: when players signaled that they would accept a given
proposal, then they would indeed accept it. In the corresponding sealed offers game, the formateur
asks the players which options they would accept, and of the emerging possibilities, he chooses
the one that he prefers most. We prove outcome equivalence to the non–communication model,
and further below, we extend this equivalence to a game where communication is not binding, but
misleading communication is associated with positive costs.
The predictions of our model are illustrated in Section 3. On one hand, we consider a parliament
2that decides on how to allocate a cake (following Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). On the other hand,
we derive the decision when there is both, a distributive dimension (cake allocation) and an ideo-
logical dimension (a political programme is chosen from the real line). The second model follows
Jackson and Moselle (2002). In any of the respective equilibria, the formateur approximately gets
the whole cake. Furthermore, in the Jackson–Moselle model, he can implement his ideal programme
if his position is within the quartiles of the parliament, and otherwise he can at least implement the
programme at the preferred quartile. This does not depend on the “size” of the cake to be allocated.
Thus, the formateurs get close to become dictators in these model families, and as we illustrate be-
low, our model provides an implementation of McKelvey (1976, 1979) majority paths in these cases.
In general, however, the formateur is not able to implement his most favorite option; an example is
given below.
Given the existing literature, these results are somewhat surprising. First, median voters are
irrelevant in the considered cases; limiting members of the parliaments are quartile voters (if at all).
Secondly, interpreting the sealed offers game, one may be surprised that the voters would reply (when
asked) that they accept proposals as extreme as the above ones; but let us note that our results require
a high order of iterative reasoning. Thirdly, the extremity is surprising even if we concentrate on the
constructive proposals game. Clearly, there is only one player who can make proposals, but this does
generally not imply uniqueness of the equilibrium outcomes (least of all in discrete option spaces).
Additionally, the formateur can not make take–it–or–leave–it offers, as in one–round games, which
suggests that his bargaining power is less here than in one–round games. His bargaining power
appears to be weakened further as he must be constructive—if the voters reject a given proposal,
they know that a new proposal or a compromise proposal would follow. As a result, if the voters are
sufﬁciently patient, then they could wait until the formateur proposes an appropriate compromise.
Regardless of their patience, however, they do not wait; they compete for pieces of the cake.
In Section 4, we examine a variation of this model where previous parliamentary decisions are
canceled when new decisions are made (this is loosely related to Dixit et al., 2000). Here, the possi-
bility of revisions is acknowledged by the voters when they evaluate the implications of supporting
a given proposals. This may lead to “tacit collusion” amongst the voters. They do not generally
compete anymore, but they can induce that decisions may trigger later revisions, following which all
players would be worse off. As a result, they would not support extreme proposals anymore. There
are several further explanations for less extreme predictions than this one, and we discuss some of
them in the concluding Section 5. A formal analysis of the case with revisable decisions and some
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
32 Sealed Offers vs. Constructive Proposals
The exposition of the results is simplest if we start with deﬁning and analyzing the sealed offers
game. We then show that the sealed offers game is outcome equivalent to a “descending proposals”
game. This game is dynamic and the formateur proposes the options in descending order (based on
his preferences) until an option is accepted. We say that two games are outcome equivalent if the sets
of outcomes sustained in equilibrium are equivalent. In our cases, these sets will be singletons. At
the end of this section, we extend the outcome equivalence to the constructive proposals game, which
is a generalization of the descending proposals game. Given the nature of these games, we ﬁnd it
most convenient to deﬁne them on discrete option spaces. For instance, if the players make offers to
the formateur, then we say that they choose a set of offers from a discrete set. Likewise, discreteness
simpliﬁes the deﬁnition of “constructive revisions” of proposals (without discreteness, some param-
eters would be required). Finally, the solution concepts would have to be signiﬁcantly more complex
in continuous games. Nonetheless, it appears that the basic intuition behind our arguments extends
to games deﬁned on continuous option spaces.
Technically, the sealed offers game resembles sealed–bid auctions, and in particular, it resembles
menu auctions (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) and team selection (Bolle, 1995). In menu auctions,
the players can contingent their bids on the eventual object allocation. In the sealed offers game that
we analyze, the valuation functions are more general, and if objects were to be auctioned off, the bids
could be contingent not only on the resulting allocation but also on the winning bids. Because of the
latter, the uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome based on (perfect) equilibrium reﬁnement does not
extend to menu auctions (generally, equilibrium selection concepts are required). The descending
proposals game resembles a Dutch auction, and thus, the outcome equivalence that we establish
relates to the revenue equivalence of ﬁrst–price, sealed–bid auctions and Dutch auctions.
2.1 Options and Preferences
Player 0 is the formateur and tries to form a winning coalition with a subset of the players N =
{1,...,n}. The set of possible programmes (political platforms) is denoted S. The set of coalitions
that can implement at least one programme s ∈ S is denoted C ⊆ P(N), where P denotes the power
set. The set of feasible programme–coalition combinations (s,c) is denoted Q0 ⊆ S×C; generally,
it would not be equal to S×C, as not all coalitions need be able to implement all programmes.
Moreover, our deﬁnition C applies equally to unicameral legislatures, bicameral legislatures, and
presidential democracies, i.e. we analyze these differing institutional settings in a uniﬁed framework.
We refer to each element q ∈ Q0 as an option; s(q) denotes the programme and c(q) denotes the
set of players whose agreement player 0 requires to implement option q. The valuation functions
vi :Q0 → IR map the set of options to the reals (for all players, including the formateur).
Player 0 has at least one outside option (the status quo), i.e. an option q ∈Q0 : c(q) = / 0 where 0
4does not require the support of any i ∈ N. In equilibrium, player 0 would only choose options r0 for
which there is no preferred outside option. Thus, only an option in the following set would be chosen
along an equilibrium path.
Q = {q ∈Q | ∀q0 : v0(q0) > v0(q) ⇒ c(q0) 6= / 0}. (1)
To simplify the notation, we restrict our attention to Q. By using the above notation, we implicitly
assume (following Romer and Rosenthal, 1978) that the valuation of the outside option would be
independent of the strategies played under formateur 0. In this way, we can not model that there is
a possibly inﬁnite sequence (protocol) of formateurs, which would end only if a formateur is able
to implement an option other than the outside option. If the protocol is ﬁnite (e.g. if the term of
legislature is ﬁnite), then the equilibrium play can be backward induced to satisfy our assumption (as
illustrated, e.g., in Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988). Inﬁnite models are considered explicitly below,
in the “Applications” section, and there we show how to generalize the above simpliﬁcation.
The valuation of some player i may depend on the programme s as well as on the coalition
implementing s. This may apply equally to parties inside the coalition as well as to those outside the
coalition, since their roles in the opposition (or, in the party hierarchy, or in any other “after–market”)
would be different. We assume that, for any pair of options, if one player is not indifferent between
the options, then no player is indifferent. Formally,
∀q,q0 ∈Q : ∃i : vi(q) 6= vi(q0) ⇒ ∀i : vi(q) 6= vi(q0). (2)
We refer to this assumption as generic valuations. Our main motivation of it is the after–market of
a parliamentary decision, which is payoff–relevant as the set of players is rather small. For instance,
if the players are parties and one party is affected by a decision, then the other parties would be
affected indirectly as well. This assumption is somewhat relevant for our uniqueness result, but note
that related assumptions are generally made in the literature (for instance, in cases of indifference
between accepting and rejecting a given proposal it is assumed that the players would accept it, see
Eraslan, 2002).
In the following, we shall not distinguish options that all players ﬁnd equivalent. We therefore
deﬁne a derived set of options R , where each of the derived options r ∈R actually comprises a class
of payoff equivalent options q ∈ Q. Let Q ⊆ Q denote a class of payoff equivalent options, and let
r ∈ R denote the corresponding derived option. In the following, C(r) denotes the set of coalitions
that are required to implement at least one of the options in Q, and S(r) denotes the set of programmes
that are supported in Q. Note that we do not require Q = S(r)×C(r). Finally, let c(r) = ∪c∈C(r) c
denote the set of players that are required for at least one option in Q.
The domain of the valuation functions vi is extended to R . We will refer to the elements of
R simply as options, though they are (by construction) sets of equivalent options. Thanks to the
construction of R , we know for all players i (including the formateur) and all option pairs r 6= r0 that
vi(r) 6= vi(r0). Based on the valuations of player 0, we ﬁnally deﬁne an ordering ≥ over the set of
5(derived) options R .
∀r1,r2 ∈R : r1 ≥ r2 ⇔ v0(r1) ≥ v0(r2) (3)
Apparently, the ordering ≥ is complete, reﬂexive, and transitive. We also deﬁne r1 = r2 as being
equivalent to r1 ≥ r2 and r2 ≥ r1, and r1 > r2 as being equivalent to r1 ≥ r2 and r1 6= r2.
2.2 The sealed offers game
The formateur asks the other players which options r ∈R they would support. That is, for each class
of payoff equivalent options, the formateur asks the players whether they would support an option
in this class. He would have to choose the option (out of this class) that he actually implements
only later, since the supporting players are indifferent with respect to the result of this choice. Each
non–formateur player i∈N offers to implement a subset ofRi ={r ∈R |i∈c(r)}, i.e. of the options
where i ∈ c(r). Subsets of Ri are denoted Ri, and the strategy set of i is P(Ri). All players are
completely informed.
Fix a strategy proﬁle R = (Ri). The indicator A(r|R) ∈ {0,1} describes whether option r can
be implemented by the formateur, i.e. A(r|R) = 1 iff ∃c ∈ C(r) ∀i ∈ c : r ∈ Ri. Thus, player 0 will
implement r∗(R) = max{r ∈R | A(r|R) = 1} in any perfect equilibrium. As this choice is unique for
each offer proﬁle (Ri), we can take it as given. Thus, only the moves of the non–formateur players
i ∈ N are strategically relevant, and we restrict our attention to a game of the players i ∈ N. The




. The strategy proﬁle R = (R1,...,Rn) is a Nash equilibrium if
no player would be better off deviating unilaterally, i.e. if
∀i ∀R0






A mixed strategy of player i maps Ri to [0,1]. It is a collection of independent probability measures,
each indicating the probability of the event that i will offer his participation under a given r ∈ Ri.
Note that we understand the acts of accepting different options as independent tasks. We denote the















The deﬁnition of Nash equilibria in mixed strategy applies as above. Let e e e denote a proﬁle (ei,r)
deﬁning a real number for all i ∈ N,r ∈ Ri. We say that (mi) is an e e e–equilibrium when it is a Nash
equilibrium in the strategy space restricted to mixed strategies satisfying mi(r) ≥ ei,r ∀i ∈ N∀r ∈Ri.
6The proﬁle (mi) is called trembling–hand perfect equilibrium (TPE) if it is a limit of e e e–equilibria for
some sequence of proﬁles (e e e) approaching 0 0 0.
We will iteratively eliminate strategies until a unique strategy proﬁle remains. The strategies that
we eliminate are (strictly) dominated under full support, and thus, the unique undominated strategy
proﬁle is the unique perfect equilibrium. The idea underlying our arguments is that we can induce
whether a player accepts option r without requiring knowledge of which options r0 > r would be
accepted by any of the players (under full support). Formally, for any r, any i ∈ c(r), and any pair of
completely mixed strategies m1
i ,m2
i that differ only in the probability assigned to accepting r, we can
show that m1
i is better than m2
i in response to some m−i iff a condition is satisﬁed that does not depend
on any of the probabilities assigned to options r0 > r. As a result, when the arguments of iterative
dominance have lead to unique acceptance probabilities for all options r0 < r, we know everything
that is required to induce whether i would accept r.
Thus, the induction proceeds as follows. The outside option is denoted r0. We can ﬁrst induce
which players would accept the option r1 = min{r0|r0 > r0}, as this would depend only on whether
the outside option would be accepted (which is trivially true). Based on this, we can induce which
players would accept r2 =min{r0|r0 >r1}, then which players would accept r3 =min{r0|r0 >r2}, and
so on. Technically, we would require only a concept of rationalizability under full support to derive
the solution, e.g. cautious rationalizability (Pearce, 1984), but under perfectness, some notation is
simpliﬁed.
Fix r ∈ R . Assume that the equilibrium strategies have already been induced for all r0 < r and
assume that the induced equilibrium probabilities would be degenerate. Let Ai(r0) ∈ {0,1} denote
the probability that i offers r0, for all r0 < r where i ∈ c(r0). If restricted to options r0 < r, then player
0 would choose g(r) as deﬁned next.
g(r) = max{r0 < r | ∃c ∈C(r0) ∀i ∈ c : Ai(r0) = 1} (7)
We will show that it is dominated to offer r for a player i who prefers g(r) over r, and that it is
dominant to offer r when it is preferred to g(r). Thus, the probabilities that r is offered would be
∀i ∈ c(r) : Ai(r) =
(
1 , if vi(r) > vi(g(r))
0 , else.
(8)
Note that Eq. (7), (8) provide a recursive deﬁnition of Ai(r) for all r and all i ∈ c(r). Let R ∗ denote
the set of TPEs.
Lemma 2.1. Fix r ∈R . Assume that for all r0 < r, the following holds.
∀R∗ ∈R ∗ ∀i ∈ c(r0) : Ai(r0) = 1 ⇔ r0 ∈ R∗
i (9)
Then, the equilibrium probabilities of accepting r are degenerate for all i ∈ c(r) and Eq. (9) holds
for r0 = r.
7Example 1
(s,c) v0 v1 v2
(x,{1}) 3 2 3
(y,{2}) 2 1 1
(z, / 0) 1 3 2
Example 2
(s,c) v0 v1 v2
(x,{1}) 3 2 1
(y,{2}) 2 1 3
(z, / 0) 1 3 2
The proof of Lemma 2.1 and selected further proofs are relegated to the appendix. By an in-
ductive argument, we can now show that the above deﬁned Ai(r) completely characterize the unique
perfect equilibrium. As a result, the set of options for which all required players offer their participa-
tion in equilibrium is
F = {r ∈ W | ∃c ∈C(r0) ∀i ∈ c : Ai(r) = 1} (10)
Player 0 will choose the one that he prefers most, maxF.
Theorem 1. The trembling–hand perfect equilibrium of a generic sealed offers game is unique. It
implies that maxF results, based on F deﬁned through Eq. (7), (8), and (10).
Proof. Eq. (9) holds for r0 = r0 = minR , since c(r0) = / 0. Moreover, we know that if it holds for all
r0 < r, then it also holds for r0 = r (Lemma 2.1). Hence, we can induce that (9) holds for all r0 ∈ R .
As a result, the set F ⊆ R , as deﬁned in (10), contains the (unique) set of options that player 0 can
implement in equilibrium, and maxF is chosen.
Example 1. The (perfect) equilibrium of the sealed offers game implies (z, / 0). It is weakly dominated
for player 2 to offer participation under (y,{2}), and strictly so under full support. Hence, player
1 would not offer his participation under (x,{1}). In this example, we can ﬁnd a second Nash
equilibrium. Inthisequilibrium, bothplayersoffertheirrespectiveoptions. Player2canoffer(y,{2})
as he would be outbid, and the strategy of 1, to offer (x,{1}), is his best response. This equilibrium
is weak, as player 2 can deviate without costs, and under full support, he would deviate.
Example 2. Option (x,{1}) results in the sealed offers game. It is dominant for player 2 to offer
participation under (y,{2}), implying that 1 would offer (x,{1}).
2.3 Equivalence to the Descending Proposals Scenario
We now show that the sealed offers game is outcome equivalent to a “Dutch auction” as deﬁned in the
following. The formateur proposes options fromR to the players until one is accepted by a sufﬁcient
number of players, or until he runs out of options. Since the elements r ∈R are actually “classes” of
equivalent options, the formateur would propose an appropriate instance of this class (i.e. if there is
an instance that would be accepted, then he would choose it). The options r are (to be) proposed in
descending order, i.e. the formateur does not act strategically here; he starts with the the option that
8he prefers most, he would end with the one that he prefers least, and he does not skip options. The
most recent proposal of the formateur deﬁnes the state of the game. The set of states is W = R , it
inheres all characteristics of R . In each state w ∈ W, the players in c(w) vote “yes” (1) or “no” (0).
If all relevant players vote yes, the game ends, and each player i realizes the payoff vi(w).
The set of states where player i has to vote is Wi = {w|i ∈ c(w)} and i’s strategy is a function
si : Wi → {0,1}. By this deﬁnition, the strategies are Markov; they depend only on the payoff–
relevant details of the history of play (and not on who was rejecting which proposal). The assumption
of Markov strategies is not restrictive and will be discussed below. The game starts in state maxW.





vi(w) , if ∃c ∈C(w) ∀j ∈ c : sj(w) = 1
p0
i(max{w0|w0 < w}|s) , otherwise.
(11)
Note that this payoff function is denoted p0, while the payoff function of the sealed offers game was
denoted as p. Note also that in w0 = minW, which is the outside–option of the formateur, no player
can vote, and thus sj(w0) = 1∀j ∈ c(w0) is satisﬁed for all strategy proﬁles. The strategy proﬁle s
induces a Nash equilibrium in state w if no player is better off deviating unilaterally, i.e. if
∀i ∀s0
i : pi(w|s) ≥ pi(w|s0
i,s−i), (12)
and it induces a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) if it induces Nash equilibria in all states w.
Mixed strategies are functions mi : Wi → [0,1] that describe for each state the probability that i votes
yes. The sets of mixed strategies are equivalent to those of the sealed offers game, and apart from
a conditional probability calculation, this applies to the payoff function as well. In state w, the
formateur would propose the option (out of class w) that is most likely to be accepted; let Pr(w|m)










Thus, we assume patient players; the results hold equivalently under discounting for discount factors
near 1. A strategy proﬁle is a TPE if it induces a perfect Nash equilibrium in state maxW (as per-
fectness is deﬁned above). Implicitly, a TPE induces perfect Nash equilibria in all states w ∈ W, and
thus, any TPE is an MPE (see also Selten, 1975).
Proposition 2.2. There is a unique TPE in any generic descending proposals game, and the equilib-
rium is outcome equivalent to that of the sealed offers game. Formally, let R∗ denote the TPE of the
sealed offers game and s∗ any TPE of the descending proposals game, then
∀r ∈R ∀i ∈ c(r) : s∗
i (r) = 1 ⇔ r ∈ R∗
i . (14)
Proof. Fix a mixed strategy proﬁle m of the descending proposals game. It can also be understood
as a mixed strategy proﬁle of the sealed offers game. In the initial state maxW, the expected payoff
9undermisequivalenttotheexpectedpayoffofthesealedoffersgameunderm(asthepayofffunctions
are equivalent then). Hence, for each perfect equilibrium of the sealed offers game, there must be
a corresponding strategy proﬁle that induces a perfect (Nash) equilibrium in state maxW, and vice
versa. Since the perfect equilibrium of the sealed offers game is unique, there also is a unique perfect
equilibrium in state maxW, and thus, a unique TPE.
Above, we concentrated on Markov strategies, and as a result of that, the (mixed) strategy space
of the descending proposals game is equivalent to that of the sealed offers game. The restriction to
Markov strategies is not necessary for the derived outcome equivalence, however. We show next that
the unrestricted perfect equilibrium (UPE) is unique, too, i.e. there is a unique perfect equilibrium
in the game where the strategies may depend on the complete history of play (i.e. on who rejected
which proposals).
Consider an arbitrary state w and let Rw = {w0|w0 ≤ w} denote the set of options that still can
result in state w. As shown above, for all w there are unique TPEs in the (descending proposals or
sealed offers) game restricted to Rw. Now consider the ﬁnal state w0 = minW. There is a unique
strategy proﬁle that induces a perfect Nash equilibrium in the game restricted to Rw0, and thus, all
UPEs must induce it in all subgames implying state w0—regardless of the history of play. Next,
consider the state w1 = min{w|w > w0}. Since the UPE payoffs in state w0 are unique, they can not
depend on the history of play in state w1. Hence, the restriction to Markov strategies is strategically
irrelevant in the descending proposals game starting in state w1, and the uniqueness of the TPEs
extends to UPEs in the descending proposals game restricted to Rw1. In this way, we can next induce
the uniqueness for state w2 = min{w|w > w1}, and iteratively for all other states.
2.4 Equivalence to the Constructive Proposals Scenario
The outcome equivalence extends to games where the options can be proposed in a rather loose or-
der. The order is restricted only by a requirement of constructiveness (to avoid “blame game” politics,
see Groseclose and McCarty, 2001). This rules out a number of subgame–perfect equilibria where
the formateur threatens to repeat a single proposal (or, some set of proposals) until it is (or, one is)
accepted. Basically, we assume that the reputation of unconstructive formateurs would suffer pro-
hibitively (sooner or later), as a result of which threats of perpetual unconstructive behavior become
incredible. We say that a proposal is constructive if it has never been proposed before or if it consti-
tutes a compromise with respect to the previous proposal (i.e. if it is less preferred by the formateur).
We assume that a formateur can not make a single unconstructive proposal (without being blamed
signiﬁcantly), but this assumption could be relaxed to allowing for any ﬁnite number of unconstruc-
tive proposals. Also, the formateur needs not be always able to come up with new proposals; the only
important feature is that he is always able to make compromise proposals (of his choice) without
being blamed of being unconstructive. We say that the assumption induces strategies in constructive
proposals.
10In a technical sense, the assumption of constructiveness relates to the assumption of stationary
strategies in majority bargaining games (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn, 1989, and Eraslan, 2002). Both
assumptions imply uniqueness of the equilibrium outcomes, only the motivations differ (a reference
to the bargaining audience in our case, and simplicity in the case of stationarity). To underline this,
let us otherwise align the following model to those assumed in the literature. On one hand, we
assume (here) that the players respond sequentially to the proposal of the formateur (note, though,
that simultaneous responses plus trembling–hand perfectness would lead to the same predictions).
The formateur makes a new proposal after the ﬁrst rejection of the standing proposal by any of the
required players. On the other hand, we explicitly assume impatience in the sense of discount factors
di less than but close to 1 (we skip a formalization of the lower bound; our results also hold for patient
players). Under more signiﬁcant discounting, the equilibrium outcome would still be unique, but the
outcome equivalence to sealed offers games can not be guaranteed (typically, the formateur would be
better off).







∈R t. Fort0 ≤t, the term ht
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respective sub–history of proposals. We use Ht to denote the set of t–round histories that are feasible
under constructiveneness. By deﬁnition, H1 =R . For all t ≥ 2, ht ∈ Ht iff ht
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the initial node (/ 0) and for any history that does not end with the outside option. Let us denote these
histories as H0, and the respective t–round histories as Ht
0. The strategy is a function s0 : H0 → R
subject to ∀h ∈ H0 : (h,s0(h)) ∈ H. Similarly, let Hi denote the histories that end with an option
requiring the support of player i ∈ N. The strategy of i ∈ N is a function si : Hi → {0,1}, describing
whether i accepts that ﬁnally proposed option. Here, we allow that the decision depends on the
history of proposals, but without restricting the generality (as above), we assume that the decision is
independent of who was rejecting which of the previous proposals. For a given strategy proﬁle s,
let a(ht|s) ∈ {0,1} indicate whether all required players support option ht
t. Formally, a(ht|s) = 1 iff
∃c ∈C(ht















The deﬁnitions of Nash and subgame–perfect equilibria (SPEs) apply as usually.
Theorem 2. Along the path of play, any SPE s∗ of a generic constructive proposals game induces
the unique TPE outcome of the corresponding descending proposals game.
113 Applications
We now analyze variants of coalitional bargaining models proposed in the literature. The models
that we cover are (originally) models of several formateurs; i.e. if the proposal of one formateur is
rejected, then a new formateur is recognized randomly. We vary these models only with respect to
the assumed communication of the formateur with the other players. Formally, we assume that each
formateur conducts the sealed offers game, but as shown above, the results extend to the constructive
proposals scenario. According to the latter, the formateur would be replaced only if he steps down
(by choosing the outside option) or if he becomes unconstructive. We assumed throughout that the
value of the outside option would not be subject to strategic considerations. The following shows
that this assumption is comparably unrestrictive in our cases.
ThefollowinganalysisreliesonacorollaryofTheorem1: anoptioncannotresultinequilibrium
if there is another option that the formateur and all required voters prefer (anything else can easily
be led to a contradiction). We concentrate on this (negative) part of the equilibrium induction (ruling
out options that can not result); we skip the explicit construction of an equilibrium.
3.1 Division of Cakes with Majority Decisions
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Eraslan (2002), and others model the division of cakes (size 1) through
majority decisions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Baron–Ferejohn Model). The bargaining proceeds in rounds, until a majority agrees
to a proposal of how to allocate the cake. In each round, a player is stochastically recognized to
propose an allocation, and in response to this proposal, the players vote yes or no. The set of players
is N such that |N| > 2, the agreement of q < |N| players is required to allocate the cake (including
the formateur), and the probability that i is recognized as formateur is pi ∈ (0,1). The recognition
probabilities are independent of the round t.
In the original model, the equilibrium outcome depends on the recognition probabilities (which
does not extend to our variant of it). In the case of uniform recognition probabilities, the player
recognized as formateur gets 1−
d(q−1)
n , where d is a discount factor, q−1 further players get d
n, and
the remaining players get zero. If n is odd and q = 1






In our variant of this model, there is a smallest monetary unit e>0 and all cake shares have to be
integral multiples of e. Thus, the option set is ﬁnite. We are interested in the equilibrium allocations
when e is close to 0; the analysis applies, however, whenever e <
pi
nq ∀i. In this model, the players are
indifferent with respect to the coalition that supports a given proposal. Thus, the various classes of
payoff–equivalent options differ only with respect to the induced allocation, any majority coalition
can implement any option. We skip a formalization of the sets of feasible majority coalitions in the
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. (17)
LetC denote the set of majority coalitions. Under option r ∈R , player j is allocated xj(r) monetary
units. As above, we assume that all players have generic valuation functions vi, i.e. no player is
indifferent with respect to any pair of options. We do not have to specify how the preferences are
reﬁned, though, as our results apply to any reﬁnement that preserves the original order. Thus, they
apply to all valuation functions satisfying
∀r1,r2 ∈R , ∀j : xj(r1) > xj(r2) ⇒ vj(r1) > vj(r2). (18)
Let r denote the current formateur. Fix any equilibrium. First, we show that no option can result
where a player other than the formateur gets qe or more. This is equivalent to showing, for any other
r ∈ R , that there is an alternative option r0 that a majority (including the formateur) prefers. That is,
for all r,
∃i 6= r : vi(r) ≥ qe ⇒ ∃r0 > r ∃c ∈C ∀j ∈ c : vj(r0) > vj(r) (19)
Option r0 can be constructed in the following way. The coalition is made up of the q−1 players
getting the smallest shares under r, plus the formateur. Thus, there is a player who gets at least qe
under r but is not in the new coalition. In r0, his share is zero, while his share is allocated such
that all players of the new coalition get at least an e more than before (including the formateur).
Consequently, all players of the coalition c(r0) prefer r0 to r, including the formateur, and thus, r may
not result in any (perfect) equilibrium of the sealed offers game.
Now, let pi denote i’s expected payoff ex ante (before the formateur is recognized), and let pi|r
denote i’s expected payoff when r is the formateur. The above implies that
∀i 6= r : pi,r < qe. (20)
This limits the expected payoff ex ante of player i. If i is the formateur, then his maximal payoff is 1;
if he is not the formateur, then his maximal payoff is less than qe. Thus, his expected payoff satisﬁes
(under the assumed bounds of pi)
pi < pi∗1+(1− pi)∗qe < 1−2nqe+2nqe∗qe = 1−2nqe(1−qe) < 1−nqe. (21)
That is, ∀i : pi < 1−nqe. Now, let r be appointed as the formateur. We know that pr < 1−nqe,
and therefore, ∃i 6= r : pi > qe. Consequently, the outside option can not result in equilibrium (see
above). This holds for each r: he reaches agreement and gets more than 1−nqe. For e approaching
zero, this is the whole cake.
Proposition 3.2. Fix an equilibrium of the Baron–Ferejohn model with sealed offers and assume
e ≈ 0. The proposal of the ﬁrst formateur is accepted and he gets (approximately) the whole cake.
The expected payoffs before the formateur is chosen approximate the recognition probabilities.
13Thus, any formateur is a dictator in this case. McKelvey (1976, 1979) has shown in a rather
general framework that any agenda setter can become a dictator. His ﬁndings are somewhat related
to this result, even though his voters are not acting strategically (farsightedly). Namely, McKelvey
has shown that (almost) any two points in the space of options can be connected by consecutive
majority votes. There is such a path in our model, too; it starts at the outside option and it ends at the
equilibrium outcome (in the above case, it approximately ends at the dictator outcome). This path is
made up by all proposals that the formateur can implement following the other players’ offers. In our
model, however, the path characterizes the equilibrium of a game, and thus, only speciﬁc paths can
result. Therefore, the existence of paths that are compatible with our model and lead to the dictator
outcome is not implied by McKelvey’s results. The path restrictions imposed through our model are
that the formateur’s valuations must be monotonically increasing along the path and that the path
must imply the smallest possible steps that lead to improvements for the formateur. One can say,
though, that our model implements a McKelvey path in the above game (note that it is implemented
in reverse order, we start with the dictator outcome and it is accepted as a majority prefers it to the
next proposal).
3.2 A Legislative Voting Game
Jackson and Moselle (2002) discuss a model where the players vote on two–dimensional proposals.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Jackson–Moselle Model). In each round a formateur is chosen randomly (using
constant recognition probabilities pi), he makes a proposal, and all players vote on it. To implement
an option, more than 50% of the players have to agree to it, including the formateur. The number
of players is odd and satisﬁes n ≥ 3. The proposal has a distributive dimension, describing how to
allocate a cake of size 1, and it has an ideological dimension, describing a one–parametric deﬁnition
of a political programme. The set of possible cake allocations is denoted X. The set of political
programmes is Y = [0,Y].
For their most general results, Jackson and Moselle (2002) assume that the valuations vi would
be separable in the following sense. For all pairs of options, (x,y) and (x0,y0), and for all i ∈ N,
vi(x,y) > vi(x,y0) ⇔ vi(x0,y) > vi(x0,y0). (22)
In addition, the valuations are single–peaked in y, i.e. for all i,x, the maximum of vi(x,y) in y is
attained at y = ˆ yi. Let ˆ y denote the median of ˆ yi over all i. We can not directly compare the results of
our model to those of Jackson and Moselle (2002), as their ﬁndings mainly concern existence of and
randomization in equilibrium. Nonetheless, we obtain a rather illustrative result if we assume linear
valuations (also deﬁned in Jackson and Moselle, 2002).
vi(r) = xi(r)+a∗|y(r)− ˆ yi| (23)
14The value of a is positive, but not otherwise restrict. The restriction to symmetric scaling terms a is
not necessary, but it simpliﬁes the notation.
If Y = 0, then the Baron–Ferejohn model results. We assume a smallest monetary unit ex and
smallest possible steps for political programmes ey. Thus, X =

x ∈ INn
0 | åi∈Nxiex ≤ 1
	
, and Y =

y ∈ [0,Y] | ∃i ∈ IN : y = i∗ey
	
. LetC denote the set of majority coalitions. Again, the players do not
care about the resulting coalition, which allows us to simplify the option set by leaving the possible
coalitions out. As above, we assume perfectly reﬁned preferences (genericity), but do not require a
speciﬁc formalization; our results hold when the original preferences are not reversed.
Fix any equilibrium. Let xi denote the mean cake share of player i and let y denote the mean
programme (both ex ante, before the formateur is recognized). Then, the expected payoff of i satisﬁes
the following inequality.
pi ≤ xi+a∗|y− ˆ yi| (24)
It is an equality only if all political programmes y that might be accepted along the path of play are
on the same side of ˆ yi, i.e. either all are on the left or all are on the right of player i. Based on this, we
can argue similarly to above. On one hand, there can not be an equilibrium where the formateur (ex
post) realizes a cake share xr that is less than 1−nqex. For any such option, there is another option
that all required players prefer; it can be constructed as above, keeping the programme y constant.
In particular, there generally is an option that all required players prefer to the outside option: it
implies the mean programme and besides the formateur, it involves the n−1
2 players with the smallest
expected cake shares. All other players realize a cake share of 0 in this option; their expected cake
shares xi are allocated to the participating players. There is enough cake to redistribute (such that all
participating players can be offered more than they realize under the outside option) when ex is small
enough, i.e. when ex < 1
n.
On the other hand, we can limit the programme y resulting under a given formateur. First, we
show that it would be between the median programme ˆ y and the formateur’s ideal programme ˆ yi.
Without loss of generality, assume that the formateur is to the right of the median, ˆ y < ˆ yi. Suppose
there would be an equilibrium implying option r such that the resulting programme is y(r)> ˆ yi. Then,
we can construct an option r0 > r where all required players are better off. The supporting coalition
is made up of the players j with ˆ yj < ˆ y, the cake allocation is the same as in r, and the political
programme is ˆ yi. Hence, the initially assumed r can not result in equilibrium. Similarly, there can
not be an equilibrium implying an option r with y(r) < ˆ y. Here, the coalition supporting a deviation
is made up of the players j such that ˆ yj > ˆ y, who are better off under programme y = ˆ y.
Finally, we show that if the formateur i is within the quartiles of the distribution of ideological
positions, then he approximately attains a dictatorship. Again, let us assume ˆ y < ˆ yi. There are n1
players to his right, with n1 > n−1
4 . In order to implement an option, he requires n2 = n−1
2 −n1
further votes, implying n1 > n2. Assume that there is an equilibrium where he would propose (and
implement) an option r that is to the left of him, y(r) < ˆ yi. This can be led to a contradiction if ex is
15sufﬁciently small. For, there is an option r0, supported by a majority, that all required players prefer.
The programme y(r0) is one step to the right of y(r), i.e. y(r0) = y(r)+ey. The cake share of r is





pieces of cake, and thus, they
are still better off under r0. These cake pieces are allocated to n2 other players (whose identities are











Note that this is positive, as n1 > n2. If ex satisﬁes this condition, then the required n2 players can





pieces of cake, implying that they indeed prefer r0 even though the
programme shifted to their disadvantage. Since there is a preferable option, the initially assumed r
can not be supported in equilibrium. As a result, only an r is sustained where y(r) = ˆ yr. A similar
argument shows that, if the formateur is outside the quartiles, then he can implement approximately
the quartile that he prefers.
Proposition 3.4. Consider an equilibrium of the Jackson–Moselle model with sealed offers, linear
valuations, and a small monetary unit ex ≈ 0. Any player recognized as the formateur reaches
agreement (without delay) and realizes a cake share of approximately 1. If the formateur’s position
is within the quartiles of the distribution of ideological positions, then he will be able implement his
most preferred political programme, otherwise he is able to implement the preferred quartile.
4 Variations of the Model
4.1 Constructive Proposal Bargaining with Imperfect Commitments
The ﬁrst model variation that we discuss uniﬁes the above models: the formateur can revise rejected
proposals (when he is constructive in the above sense), and before each round, he can ask the voters
which options they would support. Their offers are not necessarily perfectly binding in this model,
misleading communication is only costly: when player i rejects offer r after having announced that
he would accept it, then he has to bear costs ki,r > 0. It is not costly to accept a proposal without
having signaled the agreement. The formateur can deﬁne the set of voters that he asks for offers
himself. Following the offers of these players, he makes a proposal, and if it is accepted, then it
is implemented. Otherwise, he may ask for new offers (the previous offers are canceled) and make
a revised proposal. We will derive an outcome equivalence to the above games. We skip a formal
deﬁnition of the game, as the argument is comparably straightforward (given the deﬁnitions and
arguments from Section 2).
In particular, we can concentrate on proving the equivalence for the following simpliﬁed game:
when proposal r was rejected, then the formateur has to make a proposal r0 < r in the next round.
We refer to this game as the generalized descending proposals game (in the following, abbreviated
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equiv. to sealed–offers (unmodeled) Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988) model family
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gaining
to generalized DPG). The extension to the “generalized constructive proposals game” is equivalent
to the proof of Theorem 2 (which is in the appendix), it only requires an induction in the space of
games.
We prove an outcome equivalence of the generalized DPG to the descending proposals game
(DPG). To do so, we also make an induction in the space of games. We start with the game restricted
to the lowest option r0 = minR , i.e. with the game that has the option set R 0 = {r0}. The next








. The outcome equivalence is immediate for the game restricted to R 0, as this game
only has one option (the outside option).
We now consider the game restricted to R i+1, under the assumption that the equivalence holds
for R j 6= R ∀j ≤ i. Let r denote the outcome of the DPG restricted to R i+1, and let r0 denote the
respective outcome in the subgame following a rejection of r. A majority prefers r over r0. Under
the induction assumption, if r is offered in the generalized DPG, and if it were to be rejected, then r0
would result. A majority prefers r, and thus, regardless of the players’ offers, a majority accepts it
when it is proposed. In particular, this holds even if no majority had offered it; the remaining players
did not commit to accept it, but they ﬁnd themselves better off accepting it rather than rejecting it
once it is proposed. As a result, in any equilibrium, r results or an option that the formateur prefers.
The latter can be led to a contradiction. Assume an option r00 > r would result. In the DPG, no
majority would accept it, implying that no majority prefers it. It would result in the generalized DPG
if and only if a majority offers r00 and all players i in the majority have vi(r00) > vi(r)−ki,r00 (they are
better off accepting it than rejecting it plus bearing the costs of misleading communication). Under
full support, any such player i with vi(r00) < vi(r) is strictly better off not offering it. Such players
exist in any majority, and hence, no appropriate majority would offer it in equilibrium.
This argument extends the outcome equivalence to a rather large space of models, as depicted in
Table 1. In this table, we understand “ultimatum majority bargaining” as the corresponding extension
of ultimatum bargaining (see Güth et al., 1982). Moreover, we understand “new formateur is drawn
after rejected proposal” to indicate that the protocol of formateurs implies that no formateur can be
chosen a second time when a proposal of him was rejected.
174.2 Parliamentary Decisions can be Revised
We now discuss a model where the formateur can revise accepted proposals (the formal treatment is
relegated to the appendix). There are two ways of thinking about this case. On one hand, there is
an agenda setter who can make proposals that would (if accepted) cancel previous decisions of the
parliament. On the other hand, the revisions might take place behind the scenes. The formateur asks
for offers, announces his current choice, and then he is made further offers from players who see that
their payoffs would improve thus. The game ends when the formateur can not improve his current
choice anymore. We refer to this model as the ascending proposals game; it is related to English
auctions.
To illustrate its relevance, let us assume that decisions can be revised but the formateur threatens
that he would not attempt such revisions. Apparently, the formateur can only beneﬁt from a revision,
and if a proﬁtable revision is possible, then the initial threat of not attempting revisions would be
incredible (imperfect). The same applies to the other players: they could threaten not to participate
in revision rounds, but then, they would forego opportunities to improve on their expected payoffs.
These threats would be incredible, too. Consequently, the ascending proposals game is the natural
extension of the above model when revisions are merely possible. In reality, this extension may be
weakenedwhendecisionmakingiscostly, butifitisnotprohibitivelycostly, thenthemainarguments
would still apply (qualitatively).
Our model is stylized in that early decisions can be revised perfectly, they do not restrict later
decisions. In a more general model, where only partial revisions are possible, similar results would be
obtained, but some details of the argument would depend on the structure of possible revisions. We
also assume that the players care only about the ﬁnal decision (i.e. patience), but the results extend
equivalently to discount factors close to 1. Finally, we assume that the players do not care about
the end of the term of the formateur (i.e. the current formateur has an inﬁnite time horizon). This
is sufﬁcient to show that the formateur may be worse off than above; if there would additionally be
government changes, then this tendency would be even more signiﬁcant (see, e.g. Baron, 1996, and
Dixit et al., 2000).
In our formalization of this model, in each round a “sealed offers game” is played. The last
successful proposal (or, the formateur’s current favorite) deﬁnes the state of the game and serves as
the status quo in the current round. Equivalently, we could assume that a constructive proposals game
is played in each state (i.e. in each state, the formateur makes a sequence of proposals until one is
accepted, then a new state is entered). The equilibrium play can be induced backwards in the space
of possible states w ∈ W. The induction starts in the state that is most preferable to player 0 (maxW)
and ends with the least preferable one (minW). For each state, we can induce the equilibrium actions
as we did in the sealed offers game: starting with the state actions least preferable for player 0,
ending with the actions most preferable for him. The equilibrium strategies are not generally unique
(if the players are patient, then delay is possible), but the equilibrium outcome is generally unique.
18The actual induction is in the appendix; here, we want to illustrate the relevance of the possibility of
revisions. In particular, we want to answer the following two questions: Can an outcome equivalence
be established between ascending offers and sealed offers games? And, is the ascending offers game
always preferable for player 0? We do so based on the Examples 1 and 2.
Example 3 (Example 1 revisited). The (perfect) equilibrium of the sealed offers game implies (z, / 0),
as discussed above, while the equilibria of the ascending offers game imply (x,{1}). Thus, the
predictions differ. In the ascending offers game, offering (y,{2}) leads to a state resulting in the
endpoint (x,{1}). As player 2 prefers (x,{1}) to the outside option, it is weakly dominant for him
to offer (y,{2}) (strictly under full support). In response, player 1 is best off offering participation
under (x,{1}).
Example 4 (Example 2 revisited). This provides the opposite case, thereby showing that ascending
offers games are not generally favorable for player 0. Option (x,{1}) results in the sealed offers
game, see above, and (z, / 0) results in the ascending offers game. Here, it is dominant for player 2
to offer participation under (y,{2}) in the sealed offers game, while it is dominated in the ascending
offers game. For, in the ascending offers game, (y,{2}) leads to a subgame where (x,{1}) results
and player 2 would be worse off than in the outside option. Thus, 2 is better off avoiding the state
where (y,{2}) is the standing proposal.
In Example 2, the non–formateur players are better off in the outcome of the ascending offers
game than in the outcome of the sealed offers game. They manage to reach this outcome by bidding
strategically (farsightedly). Player 2 actually prefers (y,{2}) to the outside option, and if he would
bid sincerely, he would offer it in the initial state. This deviation from sincere bidding is an instance
of tacit collusion, and can be expected in a large number of such (multiple–round) voting games,
depending on the preferences.
5 Discussion and Conclusive Remarks
We analyzed models of coalitional bargaining that were constructed to represent the processes in
democratic voting institutions. Our framework allows that coalitions constitute majorities not simply
if they control given voting shares. Thus, we unify models of single parliaments, bicameral democ-
racies, and presidential democracies. We also allow that the veto rules and the required voting shares
may depend on the proposal at hand. There is no restriction of the structure of the proposals (as a
separability into distributive and ideological dimensions), nor of the preference functions (apart from
genericity). The games that we analyzed are deﬁned on discrete option spaces, which appears to be
the most convenient choice in this case. The equilibrium outcomes are unique and are character-
ized through a simple program. In two well–known applications (the Baron–Ferejohn model and the
Jackson–Moselle model), our model implies dictator outcomes along (reversed) McKelvey majority
paths, but in general, the formateur can be far away from attaining dictatorship.
19Given the discreteness of our option spaces, the outcome uniqueness may appear particularly
surprising. In most other bargaining models (e.g. Rubinstein, 1982), discreteness of the option spaces
leads to a plethora of equilibria. Our model differs from typical bargaining models, however, in that
the formateur has to revise rejected proposals constructively. When we apply this to the Rubinstein
model, assuming a constant formateur, then we can see that the corresponding outcome is unique,
too. Interestingly enough, the resulting equilibrium does not favor the formateur at all. When the
non–formateur player is sufﬁciently patient, then he would reject all proposals but the penultimate
one (the last option where the formateur is still better off than in the outside option). For, he can
induce that this proposal would be made (sooner or later) in any subgame. Hence, it is not immediate
that a formateur as we modeled him is generally close to being a dictator. Nonetheless, it results in the
examples of majority bargaining that we discussed above. In the following, we discuss the robustness
of these results. We skip arguments that we touched already. This concerns, in particular, cases where
parliamentary decisions can be revised (and extensions of this to possibly varying governments, as
modeled in Dixit et al., 2000) and the rather obvious relevance of veto rights.
In our variant of the Rubinstein model, the formateur suffers from the lack of competition be-
tween the voters. In models of majority bargaining, i.e. when unanimous decisions are explicitly not
required, competition arises rather naturally: the players can not demand higher cake shares, as the
formateur would coalesce with other players then. This presumes, however, that a sufﬁcient variety
of coalitions exists. In the models of the literature, the player’s valuations do not depend (signiﬁ-
cantly) on the resulting coalition; thus, the players are equally willing to participate in all coalitions.
It is easy to think of circumstances, however, where the players care about their reputation and would
therefore demand high compensations for participating in certain coalitions. In these case, the com-
petition between the players may be obstructed severely, leading to more moderate results. Note that
the generality of our framework allows for such effects.
Another objection to extreme results is related to observations in laboratory implementations of
“ultimatum bargaining” games (for a survey, see Camerer, 2003). There, it is observed that players
prefer outside options (zero payoffs for all) to payoff allocations extremely favoring the “proposer”
(formateur). This may apply similarly to our model of coalitional bargaining, e.g. if certain ideolog-
ical positions would never be given up for increased cake shares. Or, as it is modeled in ultimatum
games, players do not accept extreme proposals because of equity concerns—all players should ben-
eﬁt comparably from a given proposal. Again, this can be modeled within our framework.
A similar argument applies if the formateur has no cake to allocate, e.g. if his proposals would
be purely ideological (as in Primo, 2002, for instance). Apparently, competition as observed above
can not arise then. For instance, one might argue, this applies to ministers. In reply, we would argue
that ministers stay in ofﬁce for rather lengthy periods of time, and in the corresponding supergame
(with other cabinet members or coalition members), they might contingent their compromises in
future debates on the support in the current one. In the behavioral literature, such contingencies are
known as reciprocity (e.g. Rabin, 1993). Following this literature, we would say that the preferences
20for (or against) given coalitions can become signiﬁcant in later stages of the game, depending on the
coalitions’ votes in earlier stages. As a result, the formateur (minister) has got something to allocate,
implying that extreme results may be observed.
Finally, let us note that the formateurs and agenda setters are typically appointed by some prin-
cipal (e.g. by prime ministers, presidents, chairmen, or even the people). The principal appoints a
player as formateur because of this player’s preferences, and only persons with speciﬁc preferences
would be appointed as formateurs. If it can be induced that the formateur attains dictatorship follow-
ing his appointment (as in the above models), then the players voting for his appointment can vote
sincerely—they could simply vote for the candidate closest to their own preferences. More generally,
the more powerful the formateur would be, the more sincerely the appointing players can vote for
their favorites, and the less they have to vote strategically (as in Buchholz et al., 2005; for strategic
delegation in general, see e.g. Fershtman and Judd, 1987). As a result, the formateur’s power does
not generally obstruct democratic processes, it may even simplify them. Models of complete election
cycles (e.g. following Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, and Diermeier et al., 2003) may shed more
light on this issue.
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A Decisions can be Revised (Formal Treatment)
The players’ strategies depend on the proposal that was accepted most recently (the status quo).
Payoff–irrelevant aspects of the history of play are neglected, without loss of generality (as in the
descending proposals game). The set of states is denoted W = R , while w ∈ W denotes the most
recently accepted proposal. The option set R has the same characteristics as the one used above. Fix
a state w ∈ W. For notational reasons, we assume that the players may not submit offers that concern
options that player 0 does not prefer to w. Thus, the set of offers that i can make in state w is
Ri(w) =Ri∩{r|r > w}. (26)
The set of i’s strategies in state w is P(Ri(w)). A Markov strategy of i is a function si : W → P(Ri),
subject to si(w) ⊆ Ri(w) ∀w. The set of i’s Markov strategies is denoted Si. In response to a given
action proﬁle s(w) = (si(w)), player 0 implements the most preferable option and a transition to
state
t(s,w) = max({w}∪{r ∈R | ∃c ∈C(r) ∀i ∈ c : r ∈ si(w)}) (27)
occurs. If w = t(s,w), the game ends. We refer to all states satisfying w = t(s,w) as endpoints




E(t(s,w)|s) , if t(s,w) 6= w,
w , otherwise.
(28)




. Thus, we as-
sume patient players. The equilibrium outcome is robust to discounting when the discount factors
di are close to 1 (only possible delay is reduced). A proﬁle s of Markov strategies induces a Nash
equilibrium in state w if (∀i) no unilateral deviation would be proﬁtable.
∀i ∈ N∀s0
i ∈ Si : pi(s|w) ≥ pi(s0
i,s−i|w). (29)
The proﬁle s is a Markov perfect equilibrium if it induces Nash equilibria in all states w ∈ W.
24In state w, a mixed strategy of i deﬁnes for each r ∈ Ri(w) a probability that i will offer r.
Notably, Ri(w) may be an empty set; then, player i would only have the strategy of doing nothing
(and can not randomize). The set of i’s mixed strategies in state w is denoted Mi(w). It is the set of
functions mi(w) :Ri(w) → [0,1]. The set of i’s mixed strategies for the whole game is×wMi(w) =:
Mi 3 mi. A proﬁle of mixed strategies is m ∈ M.
As deﬁned above, let Pr(r|m,w) denote the probability that r can be implemented under m in
state w (i.e. that it would be offered by all required players). Then, the probability that state w0
immediately follows state w is
µ(w0|m,w) = Pr(w0|m,w)∗ Õ
r>w0
(1−Pr(r|m,w)). (30)






0 , if w0 < w
åw00>wµ(w00|m,w)∗PE(w0|m,w00) , if w0 > w
µ(w|m,w) , else.
(31)




The deﬁnition of trembling–hand perfect Markov equilibria (TPEs) applies as above. In the follow-
ing, S∗ denotes the set of pure TPEs. For the formal exposition, we restrict our attention to pure
equilibria, but the outcome’s uniqueness extends to mixed equilibria (while the equilibrium path
leading to this outcome may be stochastic).
Fix a state w ∈ W and assume, for all w0 > w, that the endpoint following a transition to state w0
would be unique (for all TPEs). Then, a function as the following exists.
∃E0 : {w0|w0 > w} → W such that ∀w0 > w, ∀s∗ ∈ S∗ : E0(w0) = E(w0|s∗) (A1)
This function, describing the play in later states, allows us to induce the equilibrium strategies for
state w. The equilibrium strategies will be characterized through “upper” and “lower” bounds (strate-
gies within these bounds differ only with respect to whether there is delay). A1,i(r|w) denotes the
minimal probability of the event that player i offers option r when the current state is w. It is based
on a term g1(r|w) describing which option r0 < r would be implemented otherwise (conditional on
the event that none of the options r00 ≥ r could be implemented). We show that player i offers his
participation under r if (but not only if) he is better off in E0(r) than in E0(g1(r|w)).
∀r > w,∀i ∈ c(r) : A1,i(r|w) =
(
1 , if vi(E0(r)) > vi(E0(g1(r|w)))
0 , else.
(33)
∀r > w : g1(r|w) = max
 
{w}∪{r0 < r | ∃c ∈C(r0) ∀i ∈ c : A1,i(r0|w) = 1}

(34)
25A2,i(r|w) denotes the respective maximal probability: player i offers participation only if (but not if)
he is not worse off in r0 than under the next–best option implementable for 0, i.e. under E0(g2(r|w)).
Note that we will show that g1(r|w) and g2(r|w) as constructed here are equivalent.
∀r > w,∀i ∈ c(r) : A2,i(r|w) =
(
1 , if vi(E0(r)) ≥ vi(E0(g1(r|w)))
0 , else.
(35)
∀r > w : g2(r|w) = max
 
{w}∪{r0 < r | ∃c ∈C(r0) ∀i ∈ c : A2,i(r0|w) = 1}

(36)
This limits the sets of options that the formateur will be able to implement in state w. To formalize
the following arguments, let As,i(r|w) denote the actual offer probabilities for a given strategy proﬁle
s ∈ S.
∀r > w : As,i(r|w) =
(
1 , if i ∈ c(r) and r ∈ si(w)
0 , else
(37)
Derived from the above, Fk(r|w) denotes a set of options that are implementable and elements of
{r0|w ≤ r0 ≤ r}, for all k ∈ {1,2,s}. For k = 1 it is the minimal set, for k = s it is the actual set, and
for k = 2 it is the maximal one.
∀r ≥ w : Fk(r|w) = {w}∪{r0 ≤ r | ∃c ∈C(r0) ∀i ∈ c : Ak,i(r0|w) = 1} (38)
The following lemmas comprise the main parts of the induction. Lemmas A.1 and A.2 state that all
strategy proﬁles that are within the above bounds (A1,A2) induce the same endpoint function (hence,
the bounds are equivalent with respect to the induced endpoints, too). Lemma A.3 states that the
equilibrium strategies must be within these bounds.
Lemma A.1. Fix w and assume (A1) applies. Next, ﬁx r ≥ w and a set F ⊆R . Then,
F1(r|w) ⊆ F ⊆ F2(r|w) ⇒ E0(maxF1(r|w)) = E0(maxF) = E0(maxF2(r|w)). (39)
Lemma A.2. Fix w and assume (A1) applies. Fix r > w and an arbitrary A3,i such that
∀r0,∀i ∈ c(r0) : w < r0 ≤ r ⇒ A1,i(r0|w) ≤ A3,i(r0|w) ≤ A2,i(r0|w). (40)
Construct Fk(r|w) for k ∈ {1,2,3} according to Eq. (38). Then, F1(r|w) ⊆ F3(r|w) ⊆ F2(r|w).
Lemma A.3. Fix w and assume (A1) applies. If s∗ ∈ S∗, then
∀r > w : A1,i(r|w) ≤ As∗,i(r|w) ≤ A2,i(r|w). (41)
As a result, we can deﬁne a function E∗ :W→W that equates with the (unique) endpoint function
induced in all TPEs. Fix any w and assume E∗ is deﬁned for all w0 >w. Iteratively (increasing r), this
allows to deﬁne f(r|w) for all r ≥ w. First, deﬁne f(w|w) = w, and using pr = f(max{r0|r0 < r}|w),
∀r > w : f(r|w) =
(
E∗(r) , if ∃c ∈C(r) ∀i ∈ c : vi(E∗(r)) > vi(pr),
pr , else.
(42)
This allows to deﬁne E∗(w) as
E∗(w) = f(maxW|w). (43)
26Theorem 3. Fix a generic ascending offers game. For all w ∈ W, each TPE s∗ induces the (unique)
endpoint E(w|s∗) = E∗(w) in state w, using E∗ as deﬁned in Equations (43), (42).
Proof. The claim holds in the state w1 = maxW. For, in the eyes of 0, maxW is the most proﬁtable
option, and in this state, the game ends as the players can not offer more preferred ones. Hence, the
resulting option is unique in this state. Thus, (A1) holds for w = w2 = max{w0|w0 < w1}, based on
which Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3 show that the endpoint resulting in w2 is unique (under perfectness),
and that it is equivalent to E∗(w2). Thus, (A1) holds for w = w3 = max{w0|w0 < w2}, and iteratively,
we can thus show that the above claim holds for all w ∈ W.
B Relegated Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Fix an arbitrary completely mixed strategy proﬁle m satisfying
∀r0 < r ∀i ∈ c(r0) :
mi(r0) > 1−e , if Ai(r0) = 1
mi(r0) < e , else
(44)
for some e > 0. Fix i ∈ c(r). First, we show that if Ai(r) = 1, then AR∗,i = 1 holds for any TPE R∗ (by
an argument of dominance). Fix an i ∈ c(r) and consider the following two strategy proﬁles m1,m2.
• strategy m1
k(r0) = mk(r0) for all r0,k ∈ c(r0) except m1
i (r) = 1
• strategy m2
k(r0) = mk(r0) for all r0,k ∈ c(r0) except m2
i (r) = 0
Let Pr(r|m) denote the probability that r can be implemented under m. Deﬁne p1 := pi(m1) and















for appropriately deﬁned conditional payoffs pA,pB. Thus, p1 > p2 is equivalent to pA > pB for all






















Let e0 denote the conditional probability that a strategy proﬁle leading to g(r) is drawn. Then, there
exists a p0 such that
pB = (1−e0)∗vi(g(r))+e0∗p0. (49)
27For each e0 > 0 there exists an e > 0 such that all mixed strategies constructed as above induce an
e0 < e0. Hence, if e is sufﬁciently close to zero, then the implied e0 is sufﬁciently close to zero such
that pA > pB is equivalent to vi(r) > vi(g(r)). This, in turn, is satisﬁed if Ai(r) = 1. Consequently,
player i is best off putting the maximal probability weight on offering r in this case. To conclude,
wheneapproaches0, thenalllimitsofcompletelymixedbestresponses(undertheinitialassumption,
Eq. 9) imply that i offers r with probability 1 if Ai(r) = 1, i.e. Ai(r) = 1 implies AR∗,i(r) = 1.
Similarly, we can argue in the second case to show that Ai(r) = 0 implies AR∗,i(r) = 0, given Eq.
(9) applies. In this case, pA < pB is equivalent to vi(r) < vi(g(r)) for sufﬁciently small e, which is
satisﬁed if Ai(r) = 0. Finally, note that either maximal or minimal probability weight for offering r
is dominant, which implies that all equilibrium probabilities are degenerate.
Proof of Theorem 2. The claim holds for the game restricted to the option setR0 ={minR }, as there
is only the outside option in this game. We show inductively that the claim also holds for games with
increasing option sets, leading to the game with option set R . The sequence of option sets is denoted
Ri, for increasing i, and for each i ≥ 1, it satisﬁes
Ri =Ri−1∪{min(R \Ri−1)}. (50)
Fix i ≥ 1 and assume that the claim holds for all j < i. Thus, if 0’s most preferred option in the game
with option set Ri is rejected, then the resulting subgame is outcome equivalent to the descending
proposals game with option set Ri−1. Hence, the decision of whether to reject maxRi is equivalent
to the respective decision in the descending proposals game. If it is accepted in the descending
proposals game, then the formateur offers it here, and it would be accepted, too. If it is not accepted in
the descending proposals game, then two cases have to be distinguished. First, assume that there are
differing equilibrium outcomes and the formateur prefers the descending proposals game equilibrium
to the one implied under s∗. Then, he can propose maxRi, which is rejected, in order to realize the
descending proposals game outcome. If he is sufﬁciently patient, he is better off thus, implying that
s∗ is not an SPE. Secondly, if there are differing equilibria and the formateur is better off under
s∗ than in the descending proposals game outcome, then there is a player i ∈ N who can deviate
proﬁtably (and unilaterally) from s∗. Let r denote the outcome of the descending proposals game,
and r0 the outcome under s∗. Since r0 does not result in the descending proposals game, there must
be players i ∈ c(r0) that do not prefer r0 to r. If any of them would reject all offers of r0, then some
r00 results. If r00 equals r, then the deviation to rejecting r0 was proﬁtable. Similarly, he is better off
in any subgame where an r00 < r should result; then, formateur would deviate to proposing maxRi,
to collect r. Finally, in a subgame where an r00 > r results, there would be another player better
off deviating such that r results. In any case, and given he is sufﬁciently patient, the ﬁrst player is
better off deviating from accepting r0. Thus, the assumed s∗ is not an equilibrium, implying that any
equilibrium leads to the descending proposals game outcome.
Proof of Lemma A.1. The claim obviously holds for r = w; in this case, E0(max{w}) = w results in
all three cases. Now, ﬁx an arbitrary r > w and, to carry out the induction, assume that the claim





max{r0 ∈ F1(w)|r0 < r}

(51)




max{r0 ∈ F2(w)|r0 < r}

. (52)
When the payoffs are equal, then the endpoints must be equal, too, i.e.
E0(r) = E0 
max{r0 ∈ F1(w)|r0 < r}

= E0 
max{r0 ∈ F2(w)|r0 < r}

. (53)
Hence, the claimed relation holds for r, as well. Iteratively, we can thus show that the claim holds for
all r ≥ w.
Proof of Lemma A.2. For all k ∈ {1,2,3}, we have w ∈ Fk(r|w) by construction. We have to show
that, for all r0 satisfying w < r0 ≤ r,
F1(r|w)∩{r0} ⊆ F3(r|w)∩{r0} ⊆ F2(r|w)∩{r0}. (54)
Assume that this does not hold for some r0. There are two possible cases to be distinguished; ﬁrst, we
consider F1(r|w)∩{r0}6⊆F3(r|w)∩{r0}. In this case, there exists an i∈c(r0) such that A1,i(r0|w)=1
and A3,i(r0|w) = 0. This implies A1,i(r0|w) 6≤ A3,i(r0|w), which contradicts the lemma’s assumption.
Similarly, F3(r|w)∩{r0} 6⊆ F2(r|w)∩{r0} contradicts the lemma’s assumption, and by transitivity,
(54) results. This holds for all r0, and thus, the lemma results.
Proof of Lemma A.3. This can be proved similarly to Lemma 2.1, and is therefore abbreviated. The
only differences are that we can construct mere bounds of the equilibrium strategies, and that in
the deﬁnitions of p1|A and p2|A, the terms vi(r) and vi(r0) have to be substituted with vi(E0(r)) and
vi(E0(r0)), respectively. As above, we have to proceed iteratively. We can show that the claim holds
for any r > w if it holds for all r0 satisfying w < r0 < r, and it trivially holds in r = w. Deﬁne
ro := E0(g1(r|w)).
On one hand, if A1,i(r|w) = 1, then As∗,i(r|w) = 1 is claimed to be implied. As above, under full
support we can show that player i would be best off putting maximal probability weight on offering
r if vi(E0(r)) > vi(ro). This holds if A1,i(r|w) = 1. As above, we can conclude that A1,i(r|w) = 1
implies that r will be offered by i in all TPEs for state w. On the other hand, if A2,i(r|w) = 0,
then As∗,i(r|w) = 0 is claimed to be implied. Player i will offer his participation in r only with
minimal probability (under full support) if vi(E0(r)) < vi(ro), which applies if A2,i(r|w) = 0. Hence,
if A2,i(r|w) = 0, then he will not offer his participation in any TPE. This holds for all i, and thus
completes the proof.
29